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Transient assemblages, ephemeral encounters, and 
the ‘beautiful story’ of a Japanese social enterprise in rural Bangladesh 
 
Abstract 
Eleven Japanese corporate executives and ten Bangladeshi village-based entrepreneurs stand around an array 
of gleaming solar panels perched precariously on piles of bricks and hay. Despite being labeled a “social 
enterprise,” this solar-energy initiative emerged neither from development planning nor from a company’s 
market strategy. Instead, the project emerged from a chaotic series of events and the Japanese state’s 
decentralized patronage politics that drew together a wide array of non-state actors in a haphazard initiative 
in Bangladesh. This article offers an ethnographic case of ephemeral encounters (building on Faier and Rofel, 
2014) and contributes to a theory of transient assemblages in development (drawing on Tsing, 2015 and 
DeLanda, 2016). It teases apart the diverse factors that produced and were produced by a solar social-
enterprise pilot project, which neither arose from a plan for a social enterprise nor generated one. I argue for 
a diffuse understanding of project agency, the productivity of non-communicative interaction, and the 
unequal material politics that characterize these encounters across difference. This alternative view on 
development decenters the project and instead focuses on the emergent properties of the act of assembling, 
even when the assemblage fails to cohere. 
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Yamada, a Japanese multinational corporation specializing in consumer and professional electronics, 
conducted a feasibility study in northwestern Bangladesh in 2013-2014 to introduce solar power in off-grid 
areas through an innovative business model.1 Solar panels would generate energy to be stored in Yamada’s 
industry-leading battery system, which in turn would charge satellite batteries, flashlights, and household 
LED (light-emitting diode) lights to be distributed to energy-poor households. The technological system 
promised to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions (compared with the use of diesel generators and oil lamps). 
The adoption of the system would help to improve local people’s health and living conditions, and families 
would be able to pursue income-generating and educational activities after dark. With such a commitment to 
positive environmental and social goals in addition to financial profits, the new business would be a “social 
enterprise” and place Yamada in a leading role among Japanese corporations that were exploring new market 
frontiers in countries with high levels of poverty. The move was striking in the degree to which it departed 
from Yamada’s traditional focus on middle-class and upper-middle-class consumers in Western Europe and 
North America. 
 Yamada’s social-enterprise model, according to a short-lived website, depended on the enlistment of 
“iAgents” (or “Information Agents”), a rural network of young women entrepreneurs trained by a local non-
governmental organization (NGO) to provide information and communications technology-based (ICT) 
services in Bangladeshi villages. Yamada would engage the young women in multiple stages during the 
formation of the social enterprise, first in conducting market research on the energy-usage patterns of village 
households; second, in making and extending markets by demonstrating the technology in households and by 
determining the prices people were willing to pay for the service; and third, in providing long-term market 
infrastructure as rural distribution channels for the circulation of charged batteries to households and depleted 
ones back to the mother system. In addition to positive social outcomes for villagers, the project would 
                                                        
1 Names of key people, places, and organizations have been altered to protect the anonymity of my interlocutors. 
  3 
support women’s empowerment and entrepreneurship in a country known for its gender inequalities. 
 Yamada’s feasibility study for this social enterprise occurred over three ten-day visits to Bangladesh 
over a six-month period. In August-September 2013, the Japanese contingent traveled to five iAgent network 
locations across the country to select a place for the exploratory project. Three months later, in December 
2013, Yamada installed the solar-panel-and-battery system (which it had shipped in advance from Japan, by 
sea to Chittagong Port and then by truck across the country to northwestern Bangladesh) and enlisted iAgents 
in conducting market research and renting the solar batteries to households in off-grid areas. Finally, in 
February 2014, the Japanese team collected the questionnaires that iAgents had completed regarding the 
energy expenditures of village households and their capacity to rent the batteries. Yamada team members 
aggregated the data, collected audio-visual evidence of villagers using the batteries, and packed up the 
technology for the journey back to Japan. 
 Yet, prior to these three visits, no one had established a plan for a social enterprise, and no social 
enterprise resulted from these activities. A “social enterprise” seems to have been an ephemeral 
entanglement – a transient assemblage – existing within, but not beyond, these three encounters. How can we 
understand the factors that produced these interactions and their results, if not a plan for a social enterprise or 
a market for solar batteries? Is this case a complex charade driven by personalized motives, does it signal a 
new and systematic dimension concerning this moment in international development, and/or does it 
exemplify the strange, messy, momentary, and spontaneous assemblages that arise from hybrid origins at the 
frontiers of capitalism and in capitalist ruins (Tsing 2015)? 
 The Yamada solar social enterprise initially appeared to be one of thousands of such recent attempts to 
generate positive environmental and social impact by building new markets for discrete projects and 
humanitarian goods at the so-called bottom of the economic pyramid (BOP), a “place” of untapped to-be 
consumers who possess little disposable income but who exist in great numbers and densities. Features of 
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this rising market are extolled by management guru C. K. Prahalad (2006) in The Fortune at the Bottom of 
the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits and taught in business schools and start-up incubators 
around the world. NGOs seeking financial self-sufficiency and corporations seeking to render their 
corporate-social-responsibility (CSR) programs more profitable increasingly turn to BOP social-enterprise 
models to achieve these objectives. On the level of the project’s brief publicity, the Yamada project 
resembled other BOP initiatives that engage local entrepreneur-distributors, such as Unilever’s promotion of 
antibacterial soap among India’s rural poor (Cross and Street, 2009), Hewlett-Packard’s delivery of 
photography services to Costa Rican and Indian villages (Schwittay, 2008), and Mars Corporation’s 
distribution of “healthier” sweets among Kenya’s urban slums (Dolan et al., n.d.). 
 Anthropological analyses of BOP social enterprises focus on their role in “greasing the skids of 
capitalism” and extending the market to unreached areas (Errington et al., 2012), often by appropriating the 
social relationships of poor consumers for capital accumulation (Elyachar, 2012). In the process, they use 
techniques for remaking the subjectivities of poor people in the service of global brands and rendering people 
and objects legible to corporate capitalism (Dolan, 2012, 2014). These BOP enterprises run at the forefront of 
a broader shift in international development from donor-driven moralities of help and social welfare to a 
market-driven ethics of self-help and economic growth (Author, 2017). They promote the ideology of the 
poor who better their lives through their own entrepreneurial skills, rather than through state or charitable 
forms of patronage (Schwittay, 2008). These practices are often aptly described as the financialization of 
poverty and the neoliberalization of international development. 
 Yet these observations do not hold true in the case of Yamada’s solar project in rural Bangladesh for 
three reasons. First, rather than a deliberate market hegemony and push for economic growth and 
accumulation, this project was characterized by radical contingency and a dispersed form of agency that 
arose from decentralized state policies and the personalized nature of public-private partnerships (Bear, 
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2012), which necessitates a rethinking of existing assumptions about planning, intentionality, and agency in 
BOP projects. Ethnographic analyses of corporations examine how “CSR offers a novel framework through 
which the agency of the company is asserted” (Rajak, 2011: 28; also Gardner, 2012). While many corporate 
forays into “development” are indeed intentional, in this case a haphazard dispersion of project agency is 
revealed through the contingent, unplanned, and spontaneous elements that produced the brief encounter 
between Yamada officials and iAgents. Project agency may lie more in the post hoc narrative process of 
reinterpreting events to show a semblance of coherence, rather than in pre-figured forms of planning or 
intentionality (Mosse, 2004). 
 Second, the activities of this social-enterprise pilot project did not facilitate the inexorable extension of 
markets via BOP products as “anti-friction” devices (Errington et al., 2012). Markets, in this case, failed to 
emerge. Rather, they enabled the extension of patronage networks and hierarchical forms of reciprocity at 
local, national, and international scales. Corporations often engage in projects displaying ethical regimes in 
order to secure local compliance and license to operate (Gardner, 2012; Rajak, 2011). Yamada pursued no 
such objective. The extension of markets was not an original goal driving this project, even though it was 
momentarily narrated as such, because Yamada had long considered corporate entry into Bangladesh as non-
viable. Instead, the key driver of the project was the Japanese government’s regional patronage policy, which 
enlisted Japanese companies such as Yamada to engage with bilateral partner countries. In Bangladesh, 
Yamada’s project presence, if not its individual project members, acted as an intermediary responding to 
short-term financial and political incentives rather than a long-term consumer-market expansion strategy. 
 Third, the calculative devices of price-setting mechanisms and market-research surveys did little to 
render people legible to corporate capitalism. Rather, the act of data collection was meaningful for the 
relationships – to the Japanese government for Yamada and to the local village community for iAgents – that 
it helped to generate. Meanwhile, Yamada executives and iAgents remained to a large extent mutually 
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unintelligible. In contrast with the development literature on interfaces (Arce and Long, 2002), brokerage 
(James, 2011), and translation (Mosse and Lewis, 2006), while various intermediaries played a role in 
drawing Yamada and iAgents together, their failure to enable communication allowed each group to follow 
short-term opportunities and maintain beneficial representations. The “social enterprise” played the role of 
vehicle (in a non-deliberate, non-premeditated way) for these other priorities to be fulfilled (Karim, 2011; 
Mosse, 2005). The devices used in the feasibility study served more relational, rather than calculative, ends 
(Street, 2012). The project enabled both parties to engage meaningfully not with each other, but in projects of 
knowledge production and legitimization directed at audiences external to the encounter. 
 The anthropological literature on energy-sector development projects and social enterprises focuses on 
materiality and actor-network approaches and draws attention to the deliberate work that goes into producing 
solar products and making markets for them (Akrich, 1994; Cross, 2013). These studies follow the 
injunctions of Appadurai (1986) and Callon and colleagues (Çaliskan and Callon, 2009; Muniesa et al., 2007) 
to understand objects via their social biographies and the continuous effort that organizations assert to frame 
them as particular (e.g., humanitarian) types of objects. 
 When products and projects fail, implementers may assess that they neglected to draw together diverse 
interests, to enlist wider political support, or to understand the habitus and practices of the intended users 
(Cross, 2013; Mosse, 2004). In a case Akrich (1994) discusses, despite strong backing from the French 
government (which sought to promote new energy sources and help the French photoelectric-cell industry 
create a market in Africa), the circumstances and preferences of the African users were considered irrelevant 
to the design process, and the technology (and all the use-related prescriptions it contained) constrained 
people’s ability to appropriate it. 
 In a similar vein, beyond being designed from afar with no user input, Yamada’s long-life photovoltaic-
battery system was initially designed for an entirely different type of customer in social, political, economic, 
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geographic, and cultural terms. The technology did fail to take root and find a market, but not because of its 
inability to adapt to the Bangladesh context. Such a technology- and enterprise-centric analysis of success 
and failure risks assuming that a market for a solar social enterprise, with this technology at its core, was the 
intended and planned outcome. Instead, we need to shift primary focus from the technology itself to the 
production as well as the productivity of this technology-enabled encounter. It was the relationship-
generating potential of the technology – in its ephemeral capacity to draw together diverse interests for a 
brief moment in time – that seemed to be the primary driver, thus making the encounter the generative force, 
rather than the technological system or even the market. 
 Taking as a focal point the events, interactions, and conversations that occurred during the three visits 
of Japanese corporate executives with Bangladeshi village entrepreneurs, this paper explores the factors that 
produced these strange encounters and the effects that the encounters themselves produced. Yet while an 
“ethnographies of encounter” approach (Faier and Rofel, 2014) would call for an examination of how our 
organizing categories – such as “BOP markets,” “corporate capitalism,” and “social enterprise” – and new 
spaces of hybrid culture emerge through everyday, worldly, unwieldy encounters across difference, the 
Yamada-iAgent case would not comply. The transient entanglements between the two groups did not 
produce a space for “creative friction” (Tsing, 2005), a hybrid culture (Faier, 2009), or even a collaborative 
(albeit unequal and messy) enterprise with negotiated understandings (Sedgwick, 2008). While the 
encounters were indeed productive, such productivity animated not the content of these confrontations but 
instead the content of the actors’ entanglements elsewhere. Thus, the analytical focus of this paper lies in 
emphasizing the experience of difference/foreignness, which encouraged renewed reflection by the separate 
parties about their own particular conditions. 
 Because no social enterprise emerged from seemingly social-enterprise-like activities among Yamada 
employees and iAgents, focusing on the acts and interpretations of encountering (versus the products of the 
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encounter per se) yields more interpretive advantage. To this end, this article engages with assemblage 
theory, and in particular Manuel DeLanda’s (2016) parsing out of the process versus the outcome 
components of the concept’s original French term, agencement. While agencement-as-noun is “an ensemble 
of components that mesh together well and produce emergent properties” (DeLanda, 2016:1) and is close to 
the English, “an assemblage”, the gerundial form (best translated as “an assembling”) refers to the action of 
mixing together a set of components. The productivity (or the “emergent properties”) of the encounter under 
question arose not from any resultant assemblage but from the acts of assembling. The bringing together of 
the two groups enabled the production of “a beautiful story” that was useful for each party’s separate 
pursuits. Thus, this analysis suggests an alternative view of development projects that decenters the project 
and instead focuses on the emergent properties of the semi-spontaneous act of assembling components of 
hybrid origins and dissociated futures.2 
 Despite the official representations (and the genuine short-term efforts of some Japanese individuals) 
focused on building a social enterprise, a transient-assemblage approach allows us to look beyond what 
“failed” to happen (would the social enterprise remain as central point of reference) and toward other 
generative forces, their effects, and the inequalities that underpin them. Assemblage theory helps us to see 
how meanings, practices, relations, identities, and subjectivities are produced in everyday life through these 
interactions, without assuming totalizing agency, market hegemony, technological centrality, or even mutual 
recognition among actors in the assemblage. This approach also enables an exploration of “the new 
orthodoxies of the unexpected” (Sedgwick, personal communication, 2015) that underpin the latest 
development practices and decentralized planning regimes and that signal the role of contingency and 
opportunism, personalized relations, and ex post narratives within such activities. 
 The Yamada-iAgent case provides material to advance the idea of transient assemblages. First, the 
                                                        
2 Many thanks to the two anonymous reviewers who helped to recognize this analytical framing. 
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meeting of strangers may be less productively understood as the intersection and commingling of two 
separate epistemological worlds (cf. Rossi, 2006) but instead as the production of a new zone of non-
communicative engagement that enables multiple agendas to be pursued. Second, project agency emerges as 
diffuse and harnessed by individuals primarily through the effective narration of events after their 
occurrence, rather than by directing the course of those events as they unfold (Mosse, 2004). Third, 
emphasizing the dynamics of inequality that are drawn on and reinforced through these encounters across 
difference is crucial (Bear et al., 2015). From them are generated renewed and strengthened bids for 
patronage in local, national, and international arenas; new configurations for the marketization of 
development; and a reinforced global narrative about the social, environmental, and financial virtues of social 




Eleven high-level executives representing Yamada arrived in a remote village in rural northwestern 
Bangladesh one evening in August 2013. There they met some young women entrepreneurs who had been 
trained as “iAgents” (by a Bangladeshi NGO that promotes women’s entrepreneurship and technology for 
development) and who provided services such as internet access, mobile banking, and digital health 
diagnostics to marginalized villagers. The fees they collected from the clients of these services were meant to 
sustain their livelihood and help to bring their families out of poverty.3 Given social expectations that women 
should refrain from spending time in the public gaze, and because they circulated through many villages and 
interacted with unrelated people, the iAgents sought constantly to reaffirm the value of their work and to 
show themselves as ethical actors. These young entrepreneurs speculated that the foreign visitors had created 
                                                        
3 See Author, 2017, forthcoming, for extended analyses of the iAgent program and the subject formation of village women as 
entrepreneurs. 
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a new technology that they could use to serve their clients in “modern” ways and, through brokering access 
to the new patron, thereby increase their status. The Yamada executives speculated that the iAgents would 
produce an efficient, low-cost grassroots “distribution mechanism” for the company’s clean-energy 
technology. These interpretations were mediated by the explanations of the iAgent umbrella organization, 
which used varying sets of representations to appeal to different types of actors. 
 I observed and participated in the three visits, which included the same core group of Japanese visitors 
and iAgent entrepreneurs. To include the longer-term and wider structural effects of these episodes, I draw 
on fifteen months of ethnographic field research in 2013-14 among the iAgents and their networks, which 
included iAgent work on Yamada activities between the visits and their efforts with other organizational 
partners prior to and following Yamada’s project. Applying this wide-angle lens sheds light on the role of 
this project within broader trends of shifting patterns of development in Bangladesh and beyond. To 
understand the genesis of the Yamada-iAgent engagement, I draw on my informal interviews of and 
everyday conversations with Yamada executives. Because Yamada products and services ultimately were not 
extended to villages, I do not focus on the villagers beyond iAgents’ efforts to gain legitimacy among them. 
 During each visit, explanations of the underlying factors that drew Yamada into partnership with the 
iAgents grew complex. I relate them in the order that the Japanese team members told them to me. No 
individual narrative is meant to represent any single causality explaining the emergence of this project per se. 
The multiple narratives are all relevant even if mutually contradictory, insofar as they are presented as factors 
according to which actors orient themselves and their choices. Jackson (2005) suggests approaching 
storytelling as an act of the present appropriating the past, which offers insight into how people evaluate and 
negotiate strategies for social and ethical action in the future. This peeling back of layers of representation 
provides insight into the ways in which policy narratives are crafted post hoc in an attempt to construct order 
out of ambiguity and happenstance (Mosse, 2004). This is the story of a transient assemblage, which 
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unfolded in three parts. 
 
The first visit: developing a social enterprise 
 
A beautiful story 
How and why did eleven Japanese professionals materialize in a remote, rural village in Bangladesh where 
iAgent entrepreneurs worked? According to the pilot project’s website (which existed for only the six-month 
period), the confluence was a quadruple-win scenario. Rural Bangladesh’s high-density, impoverished 
population lacked reliable electricity. Yamada possessed a solar-powered battery that consumers around the 
world did not yet know they wanted. iAgent entrepreneurs – with their ICT training and rural networks – 
could be empowered with new income-generating services. And the environment required people in 
developing countries to exert a smaller carbon footprint. By linking these matching demands, new business 
opportunities could be forged that would supply positive social, financial, gender-parity, and environmental 
outcomes. 
 The project would also serve as a financially sustainable subsidiary business for Yamada rather than 
being a mere one-off CSR project incurring perpetual financial loss. Yoshio Ito, a senior manager at Yamada 
Computer Science Labs, summarized the words of his contact person at Japan’s environment ministry, who 
said, “Look at it. Using green energy to help poor rural Bangladeshi villagers. The story is beautiful!” Ito and 
other actors were swept up in the discourses and dreams of social enterprise even as they knew the project 
was driven by the need for patronage elsewhere. 
 
Meeting at cross-purposes 
While the eleven Japanese businesspeople drove north from Dhaka, Bangladesh’s capital city, to a village in 
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the northwest, the family of a young iAgent named Nazneen spent the day preparing. Over the phone the 
previous evening, Rohan (a Bangladeshi representative of the iAgent head office who accompanied the 
Japanese group) had instructed the iAgent that her house would be the foreigners’ first stop. Nazneen fretted 
that the poor conditions of their home and courtyard would offend the high-status guests. Yet the family 
spent hours repairing the dwelling’s earthen floor, purchasing and cooking food, and setting up rented plastic 
tables and chairs. Her family hoped that the quality of the hospitality would help to overcome the shame of 
poverty and would attract the patronage of the visitors. 
 The Yamada team and Rohan arrived well after dark from the district capital. Efforts to invite them into 
the house were embarrassingly futile. Once inside the dwelling, after an hour’s tour around the village, they 
did not sit down on the rented chairs, and they ignored the offerings of food. Instead, they uttered surprise 
and excitement as they photographed every angle of the material conditions of the house, in which a single 
AAA-battery-powered lantern illuminated the single bare bulb disconnected yet still dangling from the roof 
beams. Makoto Kitano, the chief executive of Yamada’s consulting firm, Sustech Consulting, turned to me to 
exclaim, “This is exactly what we are looking for! Very poor! Very off-grid!” 
 
The intermediation of technology 
After leaving Nazneen’s house with most of the food untouched but with dozens of digital photographs 
stored in DSLR cameras, the Yamada team visited the local NGO in charge of coordinating iAgent work in 
that area. The executive director of the NGO attempted to give a speech about the honor of hosting esteemed 
guests at their humble organization, but the Yamada team was as unfocused on Rohan’s English translation 
as it had been on Nazneen’s hospitality. Instead, Yoshio Ito, Makoto Kitano, and the others again used their 
cameras to assay the suitability of the space for their battery system. Standing outside in the courtyard, in the 
dark, they could not see if the roof of the NGO building was slanted or flat, if the surface was made of 
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concrete or corrugated tin, or if tall trees to the south would block sunlight from reaching the solar panels. 
Rather than asking NGO staff members to answer these questions, one of Yamada’s two visiting engineers 
attached a large flashbulb to his DSLR camera, held it high over his head, and aimed it at the roof. His team 
gathered to peer at the resulting image. The flash had illuminated a flat concrete roof, which was indeed 
blocked by tall trees to the south. 
 The Yamada team employed similar practices of knowledge production to appraise each of four other 
locations across Bangladesh. They instructed Rohan to draw maps of each iAgent area and to segment places 
into on-grid and off-grid areas within a certain radius of the local iAgent-coordinating NGO (where the solar 
panels and mother battery would need to be housed). Wanting geometric schematics, they rejected 
illustrations that attempted to account for physical proximity but impassible roads. Verbal forms of 
information yielded to the simplification of technologically captured data. In the end, the Yamada team found 
a location in a district neighboring Nazneen’s. Its choice occurred after, but not because of, the following 
encounter, which illustrates the lack of mutual intelligibility (and the failure of intermediation) between 
iAgents and Yamada visitors. Inscrutability ultimately enabled, rather than constrained, productive 
engagement. While the work on brokerage and translation assumes that communication ultimately takes 
place among different groups, this case shows the opposite, that non-communicative engagement is what 
enabled the encounter to be fruitful. 
 
New patrons demand new performances  
Since the organization’s inception in 2009, the leaders of the iAgent enterprise tried to attract well-resourced 
partners in Bangladesh and across the world. iAgents learned that emotive narratives tended to attract 
funding from foreigners, and they worked hard to generate affective connections during meetings and events. 
 One such spectacle was a field visit in September 2013 by seventeen foreigners, including the Yamada 
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delegation, who packed into the meeting room of the local NGO. Rohan had coordinated the visits of 
reporters from a South Korean national news agency, documentary filmmakers from Switzerland, the 
Yamada delegation, and the resident anthropologist from London. All four groups recorded, filmed, and 
photographed the event. 
 Six iAgents sat quietly on chairs in an arc at the head of the room. After Rohan’s elaborate 
introductions, he asked the women to introduce themselves and requested two iAgents, Rahela and Dipa, to 
tell stories about their experiences. Rohan used the process of interpreting as an editing device by translating 
the iAgents’ words selectively. (Italics indicate speech omitted in the English translation.) The significance 
of the narratives lie not in the facts of the content per se, but in their interpretation as performative scripts. 
 One of my clients’ daughters was sick. Some people said she was under the influence of a ghost; there 
are many superstitions like that. I informed the mother that we were hosting a health camp that 
facilitated live consultations via videoconference. I enrolled the mother and daughter in the 
consultation with the doctor, who advised that the girl needed to come to Dhaka for treatment. The 
villagers told the mother that her daughter would be trafficked. After arriving at the hospital, the 
mother saw that many children were dying and blamed me for sending her daughter to a place to die. 
Then the doctor needed to draw blood, which the mother thought would be sold to people in other 
countries. After the procedures, the girl was sent back home. My father forced me to stop working. He 
said, “You are doing something wrong with the community, and you are making people angry with our 
family.” 
The foreigners clapped enthusiastically, which seemed to surprise the iAgents, who did not understand the 
translation or the visitors’ backgrounds. Rahela had nearly alienated her family from the village community. 
But the Koreans in the news team talked excitedly, and another layer of translation probably diluted her 
words. 
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 After Dipa’s story, Rohan invited the audience to ask questions, and a Japanese man’s hand shot up. 
Having worked in Bangladesh for several years, Takashi Toyama positioned himself as a broker between 
Japanese companies and Bangladeshi NGOs to encourage social-enterprise development. He had introduced 
Yamada’s consultant (Kitano) to the iAgent organization. He asked skeptically, “How are these stories 
connected either to ICT or the iAgent core business of making money?” 
 While the misty-eyed documentary and news teams were moved by Rahela’s and Dipa’s narratives, the 
Japanese broker focused on the technical aspects of the program rather than on its sociopolitical content. The 
deciding factor in the end for Yamada to partner with iAgents was not the visit to the countryside, nor was it 
in hearing iAgent stories, but rather in seeing, several days later in the iAgent head office in Dhaka, the 
detailed income and expense data that entrepreneurs (supposedly) sent daily. For effective report-writing to 
secure resources for the project, Yamada needed numerical rather than anecdotal data. 
 While some Yamada-delegation members stressed one type of representation of iAgents (as promoters 
and potential purveyors of technology and as numbers on a spreadsheet), iAgents asserted a different one. 
Their use of drama-laden narratives, in their experience, was the most effective (and affective) way to 
generate revenue for the umbrella social enterprise. Such stories had been the most potent form of account 
when the social enterprise drew income primarily through grants from foundations. Now, with a new kind of 
potential patron to impress, iAgents needed to adapt their stories to focus on different registers. Rohan’s 
attempts at mediation between iAgents and visitors – selecting particular iAgents to speak and partially 
redacting the messages – proved also to be irrelevant, as the content failed to capture the Yamada 
delegation’s attention. To secure the participation of actors such as Yamada (and many similar companies 
that were soon to come), multiple other simultaneous forms of knowledge had to be available for invoking 
(which the iAgent head office later presented by way of the cash-flow data). During this first visit, while 
iAgents sought patronage – via displays of hospitality and skillfully crafted narratives – Yamada executives 
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sought technological compatibility and needed to view iAgents as abstract vectors of information and 
distribution. While it may seem that the pilot project somehow managed to proceed despite the lack of 
mutual intelligibility of the two different groups, the subsequent two visits reveal a more complex picture. 
 
The second visit: a market home for a repurposed battery 
 
Desperately seeking success 
The Yamada team rented rooms in an NGO guesthouse in December 2013, near the place where Rahela and 
Dipa had described their experiences to the Korean, Swiss, and Japanese visitors. Each day the visitors 
walked to the local iAgent NGO to unpack the crates sent from Japan; devise a rooftop substructure on which 
to install the solar panels; and hook up the mother-battery system and charging units in an empty room 
below. Yamada engineers were preoccupied with testing the technology and did not interact with iAgents. 
Kitano, the consultant who coordinated the data-gathering process and would write the feasibility report, 
developed a protocol for disseminating questionnaires. Ito, concerned with corporate publicity, visually 
documented the process and the material conditions of village life in rural Bangladesh. Another consultant 
from a global audit company attempted to calculate the project’s carbon-emission-savings potential. The 
youngest and only female member of the Yamada team, Mari Kawaguchi, was also the only Bengali speaker. 
She had previously worked for Japan’s international development agency in Bangladesh and helped to train 
local-level government officials. Although she worked in Yamada Energy Devices Corporation and had the 
greatest potential claim over the project (her division had signed the ministry agreement), she was the most 
junior member. Nobuyori Uno, a senior planning manager from Yamada Corporation who hovered around 
the engineers and the technology, was the nominal leader. They had all met for the first time the week prior 
to the first visit. 
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 In the evenings, the Yamada team and I shared dinner at the iAgent-coordinating NGO, and I learned 
about the project’s background. Kitano proved to be the most forthcoming about Yamada’s reasons for 
sending this exploratory team to Bangladesh. Rather than responding to the need of rural villagers for clean 
energy (or the need of shareholders to see new corporate-ethics projects), it was the Yamada Corporation that 
needed to find a new market for its product. The following is Kitano’s explanation. 
 After the magnitude-9 earthquake and resulting tsunami that devastated Japan in March 2011, a spike in 
demand for high-quality long-life batteries grew domestically. Hundreds of thousands of middle-class 
families suffered weeks without electricity at home, and they wanted to prepare for future disasters. 
Responding to market demand, Yamada quickly developed a product prototype that was ready to be 
commercialized. Yet soon after the incident, the Japanese people forgot their prior hardship, and demand for 
the batteries fell, and Yamada needed to explore new markets for them. The batteries would not gain 
purchase in Japan, Europe, or North America, where their “traditional” (middle-class and upper-middle-class 
urban) customers resided but also where the electricity grid was stable. In countries such as Bangladesh, 
demand would be high, but households possessed low purchasing power. The social-enterprise puzzle was 
how to aggregate many households around a common photovoltaic system, which included solar panels and 
the mother battery originally intended for a single Japanese middle-class household. 
 Ito later suggested that the problem of capturing markets was a wider company (and not product-
specific) problem. He claimed, “This project is Yamada Electronics Division’s last chance at survival. Its 
power is diminishing, with our products edged out by competitors.” The primary competitors were Chinese 
companies, which Ito criticized as lacking in ethical commitment because of their exploitation of labor and 
their lack of compunction about engaging in bribery (to ease market access and bypass regulations). These 
activities lowered the costs of production, and because Yamada refused on ethical grounds to engage in them, 
the company could not compete with the ever-decreasing retail prices of Chinese consumer electronics. Ito 
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later added, “I retire in the autumn of 2015. I have only two years left. This project is also my last chance to 
leave a mark. I want to leave having done something meaningful for Yamada, so I need this social-enterprise 
market to work.” Beyond being merely a cynical publicity stunt, the idea of a social enterprise had also 
entered into the dreams and identities of individuals during this brief juncture. 
 
Like oil and water 
The first task for the Yamada team to complete was to unload the wooden crates that had been delivered 
several days previously. Although each Japanese visitor came from a different division and played a different 
role in the project, everyone helped in the set-up process. In addition to the mother-battery system, tools in 
heavy metal boxes needed to be sorted, and two types of satellite batteries, flashlights, and LED lights 
needed to be assembled from basic parts. Each unwieldy solar panel had to be lifted carefully from its 
Styrofoam housing within the crate and laid on the grass to be washed and tested. 
 iAgents watched from the periphery and speculated about the elaborate production process. They 
commented on how the Japanese seemed to take on the tasks equally. “If they were Bangladeshis,” Nilufar 
surmised, “they would have hired our brothers to do this carrying and washing. But look – the oldest ones are 
working the hardest! You can’t even tell that they’re ordering the others what to do.” Dipa, who had been 
selected to travel to Germany with Rohan on a fully funded trip to accept a corporate-sponsored award for 
ICT activism, explained why. “It’s because foreigners all work as if they are individuals. They don’t 
understand patronage.” 
 Meanwhile, the two Yamada engineers argued about how to construct a suitable substructure to support 
the solar panels on the building’s rooftop. They settled on a framework using bricks cemented in place 
overnight by a hired builder and then layering hay on top, which they had acquired from a neighboring 
farmer. When the iAgents climbed the stairs to the roof the next day, after the solar panels had been installed, 
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they laughed that the scene represented the relationship between the two countries. “This is what a 
Bangladeshi-Japanese partnership looks like! Two parts coming together but not in communication,” one part 
traditional and the other one modern (image 1). Rather than hindering the project, each of these 
misunderstandings – about the other group’s motivations, priorities, and roles – enabled each side to forgive 
differences and also rendered efforts of translation irrelevant. 
<IMAGE 1 HERE> 
 
Efforts of translation 
Back in the meeting room where Rahela and Dipa had spoken about their iAgent work, the women 
entrepreneurs greeted the Yamada team for the second time. In a training session, the iAgents received the 
seven-page questionnaire (in both Bengali and English, translated by Rohan) that they needed to administer 
among off-grid households. Rohan instructed them to use their knowledge to translate between Japanese and 
local understandings. One question asked the annual interest people paid for microcredit loans. Villagers did 
not typically know this figure as an annual percentage rate but as a proportion of their weekly repayment 
amounts. Regarding fuel oil, Yamada wanted to know consumption per person in liters per month, but 
households purchased oil weekly by weight or in units of the width of multiple fingers lined up from the 
bottom of the container. 
 Yet when iAgents visited off-grid villages to complete their questionnaires, without bothering with any 
precise metric-vernacular conversions, their translation practices were not communicative efforts to render 
village energy behaviors legible to the knowledge conventions of the Japanese. Rather, they reinterpreted the 
Japanese presence from meanings of making markets to those of gaining a new patron. “We have a new 
project,” they explained. “These batteries come from Japan, so they are high quality. These people invented 
this technology for me to provide directly to you.” iAgents then extrapolated most of the information they 
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entered in the questionnaires. Rather than efforts to translate between different bodies of knowledge (as 
Rohan had instructed them to do), iAgents used the opportunity to re-narrate Yamada’s disinterest in them as 
the appearance of patronage. 
 
Capturing (the semblance of) a patron 
During the second visit, iAgents continued to seek meaningful connection and to restructure their 
performances according to their evolving understandings of what Yamada people wanted to see. Nilufar was 
most successful in attracting Yoshio Ito to her working area. At sunset, she requested Ito to accompany her as 
she distributed freshly charged batteries. She had noticed that he spent significant time behind the camera 
lens and that he grew animated when he saw villagers handling his company’s technology. We walked into 
the darkest part of the village and crowded into an unlit thatch hut. Nilufar plugged an LED light into the 
USB port of a portable box battery, and suddenly the room was illuminated. In the next house, three children 
worked on their exercise books, crouched around a small oil lamp. When Nilufar switched on a light there, 
the youngsters gasped in surprise. “It’s very impressive,” Ito commented as we walked to the next household. 
“It goes straight to the heart,” he clarified, voice full of emotion and eyes moist. He added that he and his 
colleagues had never experienced such complete darkness, away from city lights on a starless, moonless 
night. Nilufar must have intuitively grasped that offering a phenomenologically powerful experience would 
impress the foreigners. She had been present but silent when Rahela’s and Dipa’s turning-point narratives 
had failed to move this particular group of visitors. 
 In this second visit, the need for new markets emerged from the loss of old ones. Although markets are 
the driving factor for Yamada in this set of explanations, for iAgents, the pursuit of patrons secured their 
participation and carried the project forward. Yet even this relationship needed not to be two-sided, because 
iAgents crafted their own explanations to villagers. In the third visit, patronage – albeit on a much wider 
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scale – ends up being the motivating force for Yamada as well. 
 
The third visit: tracing links and logics of connection and disconnection4 
 
Extending national interests and profitable connections 
Three months later, Yamada returned to collect the survey results, and the plot thickened. Makoto Kitano 
clarified that the project was never initially a plan for a social enterprise, nor was it a viable means of 
rescuing the company from its market challenges (although this explanation held great narrative power for 
the project’s members). Mari Kawaguchi had explained in Japan, prior to visiting Bangladesh, that product 
emplacement would not be viable. It would be impossible to bring solar energy below the cost of kerosene 
under any type of business model. (Yet because Mari was a woman and the most junior member, these 
comments were conveniently elided in the official scripts.) 
 The 2011 earthquake and tsunami had far wider-reaching effects than on Yamada’s domestic market 
share. The Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Power Plant experienced a meltdown at three reactors, and other plants 
were taken off-line. Japan had relied heavily on nuclear power prior to the earthquake, which helped Japan to 
stay on course to meet its Kyoto Protocol targets for CO2 emissions reductions. The events following the 
earthquake weakened Japan’s contribution to global climate-change efforts and thus its negotiating power on 
other fronts. 
 As a result, Japan pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol beyond the initial commitment period, but it still 
pursued various avenues for advancing its emissions-cutting goals. The country acted under bilateral 
mechanisms to cut CO2 emissions by setting up energy-management systems and forest-protection projects in 
developing countries and using Japanese technologies. Credits earned through bilateral agreements were used 
                                                        
4 Themes of connection and disconnection are significant in analyses of international development (Gardner 2012). 
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toward meeting domestic CO2 targets.  
 Japan had a pre-existing policy to facilitate the export of Japanese technologies and boost the domestic 
economy. Because such technologies were expensive compared to those of competitors, the finance ministry 
subsidized the expansion of Japanese companies abroad. Strengthening bilateral relations contributed to 
extending Japan’s influence in the region and countering China’s expanding economic power, which was a 
goal at the forefront of Japan’s national policy. A significant part of this patronage policy was decentralized 
through public-private partnerships, which produced ambiguous, behind-the-scenes negotiations and 
unpredictable outcomes, such as the project with the iAgents. 
 Japan’s environment ministry circulated in 2012 a request for proposals for research on reducing carbon 
emissions in its eight bilateral carbon-trade partner countries.  The ministry approached Makoto Kitano, CEO 
of Sustech Consulting, to encourage his client corporations to submit proposals. Kitano, who had negotiated 
carbon trading for several multinational corporations including Yamada, and who also had contacts in 
Bangladesh and Mongolia (the latter of which happened not to reply in time), brought together his 
connections. The broker in Bangladesh, Takashi Toyama, ran a profitable business that stimulated Japanese 
corporations’ engagement in social-enterprise activities in South Asia. Toyama knew about the iAgent 
network and sought to enhance his authority with the NGO by producing a prominent foreign company as a 
new partner. 
 Simultaneously, Yamada submitted a proposal to conduct a feasibility study in Bangladesh in order to 
access the generous funding provided by the Japanese environment and finance ministries. Being non-
technical and non-business persons with no understanding of the energy realities of Bangladesh, the 
bureaucrats were sufficiently convinced. Yet then Yamada needed to carry out some form of token project, 
however it would manifest. 
 These brokerage flows defy the notion of a direct partnership between Japanese corporate executives 
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and young Bangladeshi women entrepreneurs. Many layers of intermediaries with different agendas (not to 
mention natural disasters, technological breakdowns, forgetful consumers, and government policies) 
influenced the course of events. At each of the pre-project stages, the form and content of the project took 
new directions, none of which pointed explicitly to any particular market form. Agency was exerted in a 
dispersed, step-by-step way by different combinations of actors. The “plan” took shape in snowball fashion, 
by capturing bits and pieces as it veered ultimately (but not linearly) toward rural northwestern Bangladesh 
and never coalesced until the precise moments of implementation. This is a case of a strange, transient, 
messy, and spontaneous assemblage whose significance lies in the myriad acts of assembling rather than in 
any resultant and durable ensemble. 
 In the project’s literature, these layers are shrouded by the seemingly self-explanatory “social-
enterprise” business plan. Yet instead of market-driven development, the iAgents, Yamada, and the Japanese 
government all sought patronage, but they remained locked into a powerful discourse of markets, partnership, 
social enterprise, and corporate ethics. 
 
Profitable disconnections 
During the third visit, Amit, the local NGO member responsible for the iAgent program, asked the Yamada 
team how much they would pay the iAgents per questionnaire administered. Blank faces indicated that the 
issue had not been considered. 
 Amit sent someone to procure the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the local NGO and 
the iAgent head organization. Kitano said, “Yamada already paid the iAgent head office, so it is up to the 
head office to decide how it allocates its money.” While leaving the room, he paused and added, “You 
shouldn’t show me this MOU, because we have an agreement with the iAgent head office, the parent 
agreement. This local agreement is the child agreement. If I influence too much on this level, iAgent 
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headquarters can accuse me of overstepping.” 
 After the Yamada team members absented themselves from ethical decisions such as fair compensation 
for labor within their own “social enterprise,” they resumed focus on the purely technical aspects of the 
project. (iAgent officers decided to pay the iAgents thirty taka (26p) per questionnaire, but when I left 
Bangladesh six months later, the NGO had not yet released the funds. iAgents speculated angrily that Amit 
had “eaten” the money himself.) 
 Another key moment of detachment occurred during Yamada’s final visit. The photovoltaic system 
could not remain in situ for its continued use by iAgents. The battery system was a prototype, not yet on the 
market, and Yamada did not want to be held liable for any problem that happened once the pilot project 
ended. Each component was embossed with the Yamada logo and was easily traceable back to the company. 
The solar panels might stay, however. They were not manufactured by Yamada but by another client of 
Kitano’s, a photovoltaic company in Japan that had agreed to provide the technology (also a prototype) in 
exchange for data about its performance in Bangladesh’s climate. To escape responsibility for the panels 
during a project over which it had no control, that company had not stamped its logo on the product. 
Nameless, the panels were already detached from their makers. They remained perched on their bed of bricks 
and hay, collecting dirt and bird droppings. 
 Yamada Corporation and its officials never again appeared in northwestern Bangladesh. The problem 
of who might purchase the photovoltaic system remained unsolved. The carbon emissions that could be 
saved if villagers abandoned oil lamps was so negligible that Yamada did not find it worth calculating. 
 Apart from Mari’s personal knowledge, the Yamada team knew before visiting Bangladesh that a social 
enterprise would not be feasible. Ito explained that Yamada did not have an official presence in the country, 
which indicated that the company had already deemed Bangladesh to be an unviable market. Yet the 
environment ministry wanted to pay Yamada for a feasibility study. Having “such a beautiful story,” in the 
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Although a social enterprise ultimately was never produced, the encounters between Yamada executives and 
iAgent entrepreneurs generated three notable effects. First, despite the failure of an enterprise to materialize, 
Yamada’s uplifting feasibility report produced a renewed focus on and increased legitimacy for promoting 
social enterprises led by Japanese companies in bilateral client countries. Makoto Kitano (the consultant), 
Takashi Toyama (the broker), and Japanese ministry officials each used these reports as “best case practices” 
to encourage their other corporate clients. 
 Second, the fleeting partnership convinced the iAgent organization leaders that a shift toward corporate 
partners for the program (versus advocacy, foundation, and NGO affiliations) would be advantageous to the 
head office because of their income-generating potential (money that was not passed down to the iAgents). 
This move is part of a broader swing toward market-driven approaches in Bangladesh and elsewhere, which 
displaces patron-client NGO relations and has the broader effect of eroding the ability of the poor to make 
claims on existing patrons (Author, forthcoming). 
 The third effect is the reinforcement of unequal outcomes arising from these development projects. 
While iAgents and Yamada officials alike experienced momentary agency in the sense-making process of 
reinterpreting events in ways that furthered their own interests, playing along with the charade of a social 
enterprise may not be advantageous in the long run. Yamada, and increasingly other multinational 
companies, will continue to look for markets where they may not find profits, and iAgents and other people 
similar to them may not be better off under this new kind of detached and fleeting false patron. 
 Despite being labeled a “social enterprise” and a “bottom-of-the-pyramid” project, this initiative 
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emerged neither from development planning nor from a company’s market strategy. New forms of 
decentralized state planning, combined with expansionist corporate capitalism and the push for rural 
entrepreneurship, produce these ephemeral encounters that appear to be planned markets and organizational 
forms, when instead they are haphazardly drawn-together assemblages born of short-term relational 
exigencies. This account diverges from the anthropological literature on BOP social enterprises in its 
observation that, in a seemingly market-driven development initiative, the extension of markets, the 
imposition of market subjectivities, and the rendering legible of people and objects to corporate capitalism 
are far from inevitable. The analytical lens through which this article presents the ethnographic case is one 
that does not take the social enterprise as central point of reference (which would lead to an interpretation of 
its discontinuation as a “failure”). Instead, it foregrounds the messy act of assembling and the disassembled 
productivity that these encounters enabled. 
 Rather than being isolated and idiosyncratic, perhaps this case is increasingly emblematic of the current 
moment in development. The apparent need to extend markets ever further, the models of markets that 
compel instantaneous reaction to volatile events, and the unstable partnerships among public, private, NGO, 
and individualized spheres driven by disaster and poverty capitalism push people and organizations into new, 
unplanned spaces of interaction. This situation is not new because of the meetings across difference that 
occur, but because these confluences are constructed by personalized, political, and random vectors even as 
people reinterpret them as policy models for markets. Perhaps we need more analyses of “development” that 
decenter the development project and instead focus on the emergent properties of the act of assembling and 
encountering and the politics these processes encode. 
 The “beautiful story” of the solar social enterprise – with its joint ethics of care and ethics of 
commercial interest – was ultimately a façade behind which a multitude of human and non-human forces 
managed to assemble, if only for a brief moment in time, and these efforts fell away to reveal instead 
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multiple ethics of patronage. The ethnographic perspective demonstrated here reveals people’s attempts to 
attach political meaning and extract political value from the encounters and events enabled by these supposed 
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